Yellow Stars, Red Stars and Bayesian Inference

Posted in Bad Statistics, The Universe and Stuff with tags , , , , , , on May 25, 2017 by telescoper

I came across a paper on the arXiv yesterday with the title `Why do we find ourselves around a yellow star instead of a red star?’.  Here’s the abstract:

M-dwarf stars are more abundant than G-dwarf stars, so our position as observers on a planet orbiting a G-dwarf raises questions about the suitability of other stellar types for supporting life. If we consider ourselves as typical, in the anthropic sense that our environment is probably a typical one for conscious observers, then we are led to the conclusion that planets orbiting in the habitable zone of G-dwarf stars should be the best place for conscious life to develop. But such a conclusion neglects the possibility that K-dwarfs or M-dwarfs could provide more numerous sites for life to develop, both now and in the future. In this paper we analyze this problem through Bayesian inference to demonstrate that our occurrence around a G-dwarf might be a slight statistical anomaly, but only the sort of chance event that we expect to occur regularly. Even if M-dwarfs provide more numerous habitable planets today and in the future, we still expect mid G- to early K-dwarfs stars to be the most likely place for observers like ourselves. This suggests that observers with similar cognitive capabilities as us are most likely to be found at the present time and place, rather than in the future or around much smaller stars.

Athough astrobiology is not really my province,  I was intrigued enough to read on, until I came to the following paragraph in which the authors attempt to explain how Bayesian Inference works:

We approach this problem through the framework of Bayesian inference. As an example, consider a fair coin that is tossed three times in a row. Suppose that all three tosses turn up Heads. Can we conclude from this experiment that the coin must be weighted? In fact, we can still maintain our hypothesis that the coin is fair because the chances of getting three Heads in a row is 1/8. Many events with a probability of 1/8 occur every day, and so we should not be concerned about an event like this indicating that our initial assumptions are flawed. However, if we were to flip the same coin 70 times in a row with all 70 turning up Heads, we would readily conclude that the experiment is fixed. This is because the probability of flipping 70 Heads in a row is about 10-22, which is an exceedingly unlikely event that has probably never happened in the history of the universe. This
informal description of Bayesian inference provides a way to assess the probability of a hypothesis in light of new evidence.

Obviously I agree with the statement right at the end that `Bayesian inference provides a way to assess the probability of a hypothesis in light of new evidence’. That’s certainly what Bayesian inference does, but this `informal description’ is really a frequentist rather than a Bayesian argument, in that it only mentions the probability of given outcomes not the probability of different hypotheses…

Anyway, I was so unconvinced by this description’ that I stopped reading at that point and went and did something else. Since I didn’t finish the paper I won’t comment on the conclusions, although I am more than usually sceptical. You might disagree of course, so read the paper yourself and form your own opinion! For me, it goes in the file marked Bad Statistics!